Fair Governance II
Posted February 18, 2009, 12:02 ET
The case for government interference with individual preferences is usually made as a matter of paternalism, not perfectionism. That is, the claim is made that we’re really trying to make people better off or happier, not more moral. Any project to reform morals runs against the relativism of our time. Of course, the paternalist can’t be a relativist. He has to make the case that making people better off advances a moral goal. Otherwise the skeptic might say “so what?”
Nevertheless, there is a form of perfectionism or the enforcement of morals which deserves our attention. This is the claim that the person whose choices are restrained would otherwise harm society by the example offered by his immoral behavior. I call this social perfectionism.
Consider first that, to take part in the debate about enforcing morals, one must agree that moral discourse is meaningful. That is, one can’t be a moral nihilist. Otherwise one wouldn’t have standing to complain about restricting choices.
So there is such a thing as immoral behavior. Moreover, a person might obviously influence another, for good or for ill, by his conduct. The people with whom we associate rub off on ourselves, through their example.
Lastly, consider John Stuart Mill’s “harm principle”: the only basis for interfering with people’s choices is to prevent harm to others. Now, by this Mill meant physical harm only, not moral harm. But just why should we rule moral harm out of order, if we assume that it exists?
Mill conceded that we influence other by our behavior. He assumed the existence of what an economist would call social externalities or social capital. However, he saw no stopping point, if this justified legislating morals. Social perfectionism would inevitably lead to moral tyranny, because there is no limit to the kinds of laws that might be justified in this way. The only way we might protect ourselves from this, said Mill, would be to ban the argument from social externalities altogether.
Was Mill right? We tend to assume that this is a question of absrtact philosophy, and not of fact. But that’s wrong. It is a factual question. If Mill is right, then every enforcement of morals must lead to an Iranian holy fascism. And that’s not simply wrong–it’s silly. England, America, Iran, no difference really.
More later.
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